Evolutionary Game Analysis of Financial Regulation and Innovation Under Asymmetric Conditions
Issue:
Volume 6, Issue 5, October 2017
Pages:
51-57
Received:
17 August 2017
Accepted:
30 September 2017
Published:
7 November 2017
Abstract: The loose financial supervision and excessive financial innovation will lead the country to heavy losses in financial crisis. So how to balance the relationship between financial supervision and financial innovation and make financial supervision and financial innovation to achieve complementary has become a hot issue. The financial supervision and financial institutions are a process of repeated game, but the research on them is still in a superficial stage. Therefore, this paper uses evolutionary game theory and method to analyze the dynamic replication system of asymmetric evolutionary game of two groups of financial institutions and regulators in China. And the evolutionary stable state of the system under different conditions is analyzed. The conclusion is that under different parameter values, the other side adopts different strategies, and the system will tend to different equilibrium states.
Abstract: The loose financial supervision and excessive financial innovation will lead the country to heavy losses in financial crisis. So how to balance the relationship between financial supervision and financial innovation and make financial supervision and financial innovation to achieve complementary has become a hot issue. The financial supervision and...
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