The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance

Wang Ping; Wang Jing

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11

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The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance

Wang Ping, Wang Jing

Published in International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems (Volume 4, Issue 1)

Received: 26 December 2017 Accepted: 23 January 2018 Published: 11 February 2018

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Abstract

With the aging problem aggravated gradually, the pension problem has aroused the concern of many scholars and it become a very unique social problem in china. In the future development, the way to solve the aging problem will be largely through the way of pension insurance. Based on the large difference in China region, this paper chooses the rural areas with more serious aging problems, and uses the game theory to establish the complete information static game to discuss the game relationship between the government and the individual in the rural endowment insurance. Finally, on the basis of certain assumptions, a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance is established, and this paper solve the Nash equilibrium (solution) and utility of the game model in the range of ZZ (the government's profit value when the government chooses to provide the strategy) and the GG (personal benefit value of the individual's choice of payment strategy). Finally, this paper discusses the assumptions and gives the prospect to the further development of the model.

Published in	International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems (Volume 4, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11
Page(s)	1-6
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2018. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Pension Problem, Rural Endowment Insurance, Complete Information Static Game, Nash Equilibrium

References

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[2]	Ministry of Civil Affairs. Statistical Communique on Social Service Development 2014 [EB / OL], 2015: 6-10.
[3]	Yang Yansui. China's Aging Society and Pension Development Report (2013) [M], Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. 2013: 98-100.
[4]	Jiang Dan. To Deal with the Aging Population "Six Policy" [J], Learning TimesPress. 2015 (3).
[5]	Zheng Gongcheng. China's Social Security Reform and Development Strategy [M], Beijing: People's Publishing House. 2011: 64-67.
[6]	Tang Jun. The Status Quo, Problems and Prospects of China's Elderly Services [J], Journal of the National Administration. 2015 (3).
[7]	M. Martinboyer. Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation [J], The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory. 2000 (25): 159-178.
[8]	Song Wang, Zhengzheng Sheng. China's Pension Insurance in the Game between Government and Enterprises [J], Fujian Administration Institute of Fujian Institute of Economic Leaders. 2004 (2): 45.
[9]	Cheng Gongcheng. Social Security [M], Beijing: China Labor and Social Security Publishing House. 2005.
[10]	Lu Jing. Study on the Relationship between the Game of Local Governments in Our Country and the Basic Old-age Insurance [J], Science and Technology. 2008 (10): 118.
[11]	Weirich P. Equilibrium and Rationality: A Game Theory Modified by Decision Rules [M], Beijing: Economic Science Press. 2000: 12.
[12]	Amitai Etzioni. The Fightagainst Fraud and Abuse: Analyzing Constituent Support [J], Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 1982 (Autumn): 26-38.
[13]	Xie Zhiyu. Economic Game Theory [M], Shanghai: Fudan University Press. 2006.
[14]	Zhang Weiying. Game Theory and Information Economics [M], Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House. 1996.
[15]	Shi Xiquan. Game Theory [M], Shanghai: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Press. 2002.
[16]	Tu Zhiyong. Game Theory [M], Beijing: Peking University Press. 2009.
[17]	Zheng Gongcheng. Social Security [M], Beijing: Commercial Press. 2000.
[18]	Camerer C. F. (He Jingtong, Na Yi, Ji Jiapeng et al.) Behavioral Gaming: An Experimental Study of Strategic Interactions [M], Beijing: Renmin University Press. 2006.
[19]	Wu Fan. Analysis on the Supply and Demand of the Aged Resources in China and the Intervention Model of Social Work[J], Journal of Population Sciences. 2007 (3): 47-51.
[20]	Li Min, Zeng Yongquan. Government and Enterprises in the Social Pension Insurance in the Game[J], Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Social Science Edition) 2007.

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APA Style

Wang Ping, Wang Jing. (2018). The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance. International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems, 4(1), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11

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ACS Style

Wang Ping; Wang Jing. The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance. Int. J. Manag. Fuzzy Syst. 2018, 4(1), 1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11

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AMA Style

Wang Ping, Wang Jing. The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance. Int J Manag Fuzzy Syst. 2018;4(1):1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11

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@article{10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11,
  author = {Wang Ping and Wang Jing},
  title = {The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance},
  journal = {International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems},
  volume = {4},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1-6},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijmfs.20180401.11},
  abstract = {With the aging problem aggravated gradually, the pension problem has aroused the concern of many scholars and it become a very unique social problem in china. In the future development, the way to solve the aging problem will be largely through the way of pension insurance. Based on the large difference in China region, this paper chooses the rural areas with more serious aging problems, and uses the game theory to establish the complete information static game to discuss the game relationship between the government and the individual in the rural endowment insurance. Finally, on the basis of certain assumptions, a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance is established, and this paper solve the Nash equilibrium (solution) and utility of the game model in the range of ZZ (the government's profit value when the government chooses to provide the strategy) and the GG (personal benefit value of the individual's choice of payment strategy). Finally, this paper discusses the assumptions and gives the prospect to the further development of the model.},
 year = {2018}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance
AU  - Wang Ping
AU  - Wang Jing
Y1  - 2018/02/11
PY  - 2018
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11
T2  - International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems
JF  - International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems
JO  - International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems
SP  - 1
EP  - 6
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2575-4947
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11
AB  - With the aging problem aggravated gradually, the pension problem has aroused the concern of many scholars and it become a very unique social problem in china. In the future development, the way to solve the aging problem will be largely through the way of pension insurance. Based on the large difference in China region, this paper chooses the rural areas with more serious aging problems, and uses the game theory to establish the complete information static game to discuss the game relationship between the government and the individual in the rural endowment insurance. Finally, on the basis of certain assumptions, a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance is established, and this paper solve the Nash equilibrium (solution) and utility of the game model in the range of ZZ (the government's profit value when the government chooses to provide the strategy) and the GG (personal benefit value of the individual's choice of payment strategy). Finally, this paper discusses the assumptions and gives the prospect to the further development of the model.
VL  - 4
IS  - 1
ER  -

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Author Information

Wang Ping

School of Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an, China
Wang Jing

School of Management, Xi’an University of Science and Technology, Xi’an, China

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APA Style

Wang Ping, Wang Jing. (2018). The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance. International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems, 4(1), 1-6. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11

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ACS Style

Wang Ping; Wang Jing. The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance. Int. J. Manag. Fuzzy Syst. 2018, 4(1), 1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Wang Ping, Wang Jing. The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance. Int J Manag Fuzzy Syst. 2018;4(1):1-6. doi: 10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11,
  author = {Wang Ping and Wang Jing},
  title = {The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance},
  journal = {International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems},
  volume = {4},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1-6},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijmfs.20180401.11},
  abstract = {With the aging problem aggravated gradually, the pension problem has aroused the concern of many scholars and it become a very unique social problem in china. In the future development, the way to solve the aging problem will be largely through the way of pension insurance. Based on the large difference in China region, this paper chooses the rural areas with more serious aging problems, and uses the game theory to establish the complete information static game to discuss the game relationship between the government and the individual in the rural endowment insurance. Finally, on the basis of certain assumptions, a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance is established, and this paper solve the Nash equilibrium (solution) and utility of the game model in the range of ZZ (the government's profit value when the government chooses to provide the strategy) and the GG (personal benefit value of the individual's choice of payment strategy). Finally, this paper discusses the assumptions and gives the prospect to the further development of the model.},
 year = {2018}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Game Relationship Between Government and Individual in China Rural Endowment Insurance
AU  - Wang Ping
AU  - Wang Jing
Y1  - 2018/02/11
PY  - 2018
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11
T2  - International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems
JF  - International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems
JO  - International Journal of Management and Fuzzy Systems
SP  - 1
EP  - 6
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2575-4947
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijmfs.20180401.11
AB  - With the aging problem aggravated gradually, the pension problem has aroused the concern of many scholars and it become a very unique social problem in china. In the future development, the way to solve the aging problem will be largely through the way of pension insurance. Based on the large difference in China region, this paper chooses the rural areas with more serious aging problems, and uses the game theory to establish the complete information static game to discuss the game relationship between the government and the individual in the rural endowment insurance. Finally, on the basis of certain assumptions, a complete information static game model of government and individual in rural endowment insurance is established, and this paper solve the Nash equilibrium (solution) and utility of the game model in the range of ZZ (the government's profit value when the government chooses to provide the strategy) and the GG (personal benefit value of the individual's choice of payment strategy). Finally, this paper discusses the assumptions and gives the prospect to the further development of the model.
VL  - 4
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download