To say “I don’t know” appears at first as absence, yet this phrase contains within it a disciplined stance that resists premature conviction. Human discourse often leans toward certainty, but certainty offered without ground can corrupt inquiry and spread error. The practice of hesitation deserves close study, for it is not silence but a particular form of speech that refuses to disguise ignorance. If belief is written as Bp and knowledge as Kp, then the admission “I don’t know” can be expressed as -Bp ˄-Kp, which reveals its logical form as suspension rather than negation of truth. This article examines the virtue of uncertainty in philosophy, logic, and science, showing how hesitation can serve as a method of clarity rather than as deficiency. Socratic dialogue begins with acknowledged ignorance, modern logic admits undecidability, and probability theory advises suspension when P(p) < t, with t as the threshold for rational acceptance. To embrace uncertainty under such conditions is not to abandon truth but to keep the space open for truth to arrive. This article draws from classical and modern sources, examines with logical symbols that clarify the structure of belief, and reflects on the ethical weight of honest hesitation in domains such as science, ethics, and public reasoning. The conclusion offered is that uncertainty is a reasonable alternative to belief, a posture that, far from weakness, affirms the responsibility of thought and shields inquiry from the hazards of unwarranted assertion.
| Published in | Research & Development (Volume 6, Issue 4) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12 |
| Page(s) | 78-84 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Uncertainty, Belief, Knowledge, Rationality, Logic, Probability, Epistemology, Philosophy
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APA Style
Hassen, M. Z. (2025). The Virtue of Saying, “I Don’t Know”: When Uncertainty Is a Reasonable Alternative to Belief. Research & Development, 6(4), 78-84. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12
ACS Style
Hassen, M. Z. The Virtue of Saying, “I Don’t Know”: When Uncertainty Is a Reasonable Alternative to Belief. Res. Dev. 2025, 6(4), 78-84. doi: 10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12
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Download@article{10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12,
author = {Mohammed Zeinu Hassen},
title = {The Virtue of Saying, “I Don’t Know”: When Uncertainty Is a Reasonable Alternative to Belief
},
journal = {Research & Development},
volume = {6},
number = {4},
pages = {78-84},
doi = {10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.rd.20250604.12},
abstract = {To say “I don’t know” appears at first as absence, yet this phrase contains within it a disciplined stance that resists premature conviction. Human discourse often leans toward certainty, but certainty offered without ground can corrupt inquiry and spread error. The practice of hesitation deserves close study, for it is not silence but a particular form of speech that refuses to disguise ignorance. If belief is written as Bp and knowledge as Kp, then the admission “I don’t know” can be expressed as -Bp ˄-Kp, which reveals its logical form as suspension rather than negation of truth. This article examines the virtue of uncertainty in philosophy, logic, and science, showing how hesitation can serve as a method of clarity rather than as deficiency. Socratic dialogue begins with acknowledged ignorance, modern logic admits undecidability, and probability theory advises suspension when P(p) < t, with t as the threshold for rational acceptance. To embrace uncertainty under such conditions is not to abandon truth but to keep the space open for truth to arrive. This article draws from classical and modern sources, examines with logical symbols that clarify the structure of belief, and reflects on the ethical weight of honest hesitation in domains such as science, ethics, and public reasoning. The conclusion offered is that uncertainty is a reasonable alternative to belief, a posture that, far from weakness, affirms the responsibility of thought and shields inquiry from the hazards of unwarranted assertion.
},
year = {2025}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - The Virtue of Saying, “I Don’t Know”: When Uncertainty Is a Reasonable Alternative to Belief AU - Mohammed Zeinu Hassen Y1 - 2025/11/12 PY - 2025 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12 DO - 10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12 T2 - Research & Development JF - Research & Development JO - Research & Development SP - 78 EP - 84 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2994-7057 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.rd.20250604.12 AB - To say “I don’t know” appears at first as absence, yet this phrase contains within it a disciplined stance that resists premature conviction. Human discourse often leans toward certainty, but certainty offered without ground can corrupt inquiry and spread error. The practice of hesitation deserves close study, for it is not silence but a particular form of speech that refuses to disguise ignorance. If belief is written as Bp and knowledge as Kp, then the admission “I don’t know” can be expressed as -Bp ˄-Kp, which reveals its logical form as suspension rather than negation of truth. This article examines the virtue of uncertainty in philosophy, logic, and science, showing how hesitation can serve as a method of clarity rather than as deficiency. Socratic dialogue begins with acknowledged ignorance, modern logic admits undecidability, and probability theory advises suspension when P(p) < t, with t as the threshold for rational acceptance. To embrace uncertainty under such conditions is not to abandon truth but to keep the space open for truth to arrive. This article draws from classical and modern sources, examines with logical symbols that clarify the structure of belief, and reflects on the ethical weight of honest hesitation in domains such as science, ethics, and public reasoning. The conclusion offered is that uncertainty is a reasonable alternative to belief, a posture that, far from weakness, affirms the responsibility of thought and shields inquiry from the hazards of unwarranted assertion. VL - 6 IS - 4 ER -
Department of Social Sciences, Addis Ababa Science and Technology University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
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