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Transference and Countertheories, From a Moral Standpoint

Received: 14 January 2022     Accepted: 15 March 2022     Published: 8 June 2022
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Abstract

Although Alfred Adler is known as one of the first relationalists, he pays scant attention to the therapeutic relationship per se. The landscape changes with Ferenczi, O. Rank and H. Racker, and as interpersonalists and relationalists of neo-Freudian and object relations schools explicitly take up the questions of love and hate in the analytic setting. For Jung and Lacan, it is not only acknowledged but methodologically key that desire play itself out in the clinical space as it does everywhere else, but particularly here, given the paradoxical combination of intimacy and inhibition that characterizes this dyadic situation. It has by now become commonplace in the literature to acknowledge erotic (or anti-erotic) feelings, one-sidedly or mutually, and take these as normal and as contributive to the therapeutic process. Yet what does it mean that relationship “feelings” can be utilized therapeutically? And how is it that asymmetry - imbalance of power and knowledge - can be construed as therapeutic in a clinical context, but unhealthy in “real” relationships? This essay begins with an overview of friendship in general, best articulated by Aristotle; and then broadly surveys the normative implications of the instrumentalization of relationships and feelings in clinical work. Such considerations may either confound or greatly enrich our conception of practical reason.

Published in International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 10, Issue 2)
DOI 10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.12
Page(s) 63-68
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Transference, Countertransference, Social Feeling, Friendship, Regulative Ideal, Categorical Imperative, Instrumentalization, Practical Reason

References
[1] Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33 (124) 1-16.
[2] Bargh, J. A. & Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The Unbearable Automaticity of Being. American Psychologist, 54 (7), 462-479.
[3] Foot, P. (1972). Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. The Philosophical Review, 81 (3), 305-316.
[4] Friedman, L. (2005). Is There a Special Psychoanalytic Love? Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 53 (2).
[5] Kernberg, O. (2004). Aggressivity, Narcissism, and Self-Destructiveness in the Psychotherapeutic Relationship. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 102.
[6] Klein, M. (2017). Lectures on Technique. London: Routledge.
[7] Nussbaum, M. (1994). The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
[8] Nussbaum, M. (2005). Analytic Love and Human Vulnerability: A Comment on Lawrence Friedman’s “Is there a Special Psychoanalytic Love?” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 53 (2).
[9] Shlien, J. (2003). A Countertheory of Transference. In To Lead an Honorable Life. Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books.
[10] Singer, I. (2001). Feeling and Imagination: The Vibrant Flux of Our Existence. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
[11] Solms, M. (2013). The Conscious Id. Neuropsychoanalysis, 2013, 15 (1), 5-19.
[12] Solms, M. (2019). The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle. Frontiers in Psychology, 9 (2714).
[13] Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., and Rudrauf, D. (2018). The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood. Frontiers in Psychology, 9 (2571).
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  • APA Style

    Cora Cruz. (2022). Transference and Countertheories, From a Moral Standpoint. International Journal of Philosophy, 10(2), 63-68. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.12

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    ACS Style

    Cora Cruz. Transference and Countertheories, From a Moral Standpoint. Int. J. Philos. 2022, 10(2), 63-68. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.12

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    AMA Style

    Cora Cruz. Transference and Countertheories, From a Moral Standpoint. Int J Philos. 2022;10(2):63-68. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.12

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.12,
      author = {Cora Cruz},
      title = {Transference and Countertheories, From a Moral Standpoint},
      journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
      volume = {10},
      number = {2},
      pages = {63-68},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.12},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20221002.12},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20221002.12},
      abstract = {Although Alfred Adler is known as one of the first relationalists, he pays scant attention to the therapeutic relationship per se. The landscape changes with Ferenczi, O. Rank and H. Racker, and as interpersonalists and relationalists of neo-Freudian and object relations schools explicitly take up the questions of love and hate in the analytic setting. For Jung and Lacan, it is not only acknowledged but methodologically key that desire play itself out in the clinical space as it does everywhere else, but particularly here, given the paradoxical combination of intimacy and inhibition that characterizes this dyadic situation. It has by now become commonplace in the literature to acknowledge erotic (or anti-erotic) feelings, one-sidedly or mutually, and take these as normal and as contributive to the therapeutic process. Yet what does it mean that relationship “feelings” can be utilized therapeutically? And how is it that asymmetry - imbalance of power and knowledge - can be construed as therapeutic in a clinical context, but unhealthy in “real” relationships? This essay begins with an overview of friendship in general, best articulated by Aristotle; and then broadly surveys the normative implications of the instrumentalization of relationships and feelings in clinical work. Such considerations may either confound or greatly enrich our conception of practical reason.},
     year = {2022}
    }
    

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    AB  - Although Alfred Adler is known as one of the first relationalists, he pays scant attention to the therapeutic relationship per se. The landscape changes with Ferenczi, O. Rank and H. Racker, and as interpersonalists and relationalists of neo-Freudian and object relations schools explicitly take up the questions of love and hate in the analytic setting. For Jung and Lacan, it is not only acknowledged but methodologically key that desire play itself out in the clinical space as it does everywhere else, but particularly here, given the paradoxical combination of intimacy and inhibition that characterizes this dyadic situation. It has by now become commonplace in the literature to acknowledge erotic (or anti-erotic) feelings, one-sidedly or mutually, and take these as normal and as contributive to the therapeutic process. Yet what does it mean that relationship “feelings” can be utilized therapeutically? And how is it that asymmetry - imbalance of power and knowledge - can be construed as therapeutic in a clinical context, but unhealthy in “real” relationships? This essay begins with an overview of friendship in general, best articulated by Aristotle; and then broadly surveys the normative implications of the instrumentalization of relationships and feelings in clinical work. Such considerations may either confound or greatly enrich our conception of practical reason.
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Author Information
  • Department of Philosophy, The New School for Social Research, New York, USA

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