Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) central bank independence was a popular topic among those who favoured price stability. A conservative central banker, without being influenced by the economic policies of the government, can maintain as its primary priority the maintenance of price stability. The response of central bankers to the GFC seems to indicate a very different approach to macroeconomic targeting. In this paper we present empirical results using the Engel Granger cointegration technique for five countries and the results show that persistent cointegration of series from 2000 until 2006-2007 did not continue in the latter part of the sample period. These results are indicative of significant changes in central bank behaviour.
| Published in | Economics (Volume 2, Issue 5) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12 |
| Page(s) | 55-61 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2013. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Central Banking, Financial Crises, Inflation Targeting
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APA Style
Mehdi Monadjemi, Kyung H. Yoon, John Lodewijks. (2013). Central Bank Behaviour before and after the Great Recession. Economics, 2(5), 55-61. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12
ACS Style
Mehdi Monadjemi; Kyung H. Yoon; John Lodewijks. Central Bank Behaviour before and after the Great Recession. Economics. 2013, 2(5), 55-61. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12
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Download@article{10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12,
author = {Mehdi Monadjemi and Kyung H. Yoon and John Lodewijks},
title = {Central Bank Behaviour before and after the Great Recession},
journal = {Economics},
volume = {2},
number = {5},
pages = {55-61},
doi = {10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.eco.20130205.12},
abstract = {Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) central bank independence was a popular topic among those who favoured price stability. A conservative central banker, without being influenced by the economic policies of the government, can maintain as its primary priority the maintenance of price stability. The response of central bankers to the GFC seems to indicate a very different approach to macroeconomic targeting. In this paper we present empirical results using the Engel Granger cointegration technique for five countries and the results show that persistent cointegration of series from 2000 until 2006-2007 did not continue in the latter part of the sample period. These results are indicative of significant changes in central bank behaviour.},
year = {2013}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Central Bank Behaviour before and after the Great Recession AU - Mehdi Monadjemi AU - Kyung H. Yoon AU - John Lodewijks Y1 - 2013/11/20 PY - 2013 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12 DO - 10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12 T2 - Economics JF - Economics JO - Economics SP - 55 EP - 61 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2376-6603 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.20130205.12 AB - Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) central bank independence was a popular topic among those who favoured price stability. A conservative central banker, without being influenced by the economic policies of the government, can maintain as its primary priority the maintenance of price stability. The response of central bankers to the GFC seems to indicate a very different approach to macroeconomic targeting. In this paper we present empirical results using the Engel Granger cointegration technique for five countries and the results show that persistent cointegration of series from 2000 until 2006-2007 did not continue in the latter part of the sample period. These results are indicative of significant changes in central bank behaviour. VL - 2 IS - 5 ER -
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