Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone

Yang Guo-zhong

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

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Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone

Yang Guo-zhong

Published in Advances in Sciences and Humanities (Volume 3, Issue 6)

Received: 28 February 2017 Accepted: 26 April 2017 Published: 31 October 2017

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Abstract

By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.

Published in	Advances in Sciences and Humanities (Volume 3, Issue 6)
DOI	10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
Page(s)	82-86
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2017. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

High-tech Zone, Innovation Diffusion, Incentive Mechanism

References

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[8]	HUANG Wei-qiang; YAO Shuang; ZHUANG Xin-tian; XIN Wei. Innovation Diffusion Modeling Based on Scale-Free Networks. Journal of Northeastern University (Natural Science), 2015, 36(8):1212-1216.
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[10]	XU Ying-ying; QI Liang-qun. Research on low carbon technological innovation diffusion in enterprises clusters based on evolutionary game theory on complex networks. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2016, 26(8):16-24.
[11]	MA Yong-hong, WANG Zhan-zhao, LI Huan, ZHOU Wen. Network Structure, Adopters Preference and Innovation Diffusion: A Simulation Analysis of the S-D Model of Innovation Diffusion Based on the Decision Making Process of Adopters. Operations Research and Management Science, 2016, 25(3): 106-116.
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APA Style

Yang Guo-zhong. (2017). Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Advances in Sciences and Humanities, 3(6), 82-86. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

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ACS Style

Yang Guo-zhong. Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Adv. Sci. Humanit. 2017, 3(6), 82-86. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

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AMA Style

Yang Guo-zhong. Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Adv Sci Humanit. 2017;3(6):82-86. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

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@article{10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12,
  author = {Yang Guo-zhong},
  title = {Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone},
  journal = {Advances in Sciences and Humanities},
  volume = {3},
  number = {6},
  pages = {82-86},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ash.20170306.12},
  abstract = {By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.},
 year = {2017}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone
AU  - Yang Guo-zhong
Y1  - 2017/10/31
PY  - 2017
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
T2  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
JF  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
JO  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
SP  - 82
EP  - 86
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2472-0984
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
AB  - By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.
VL  - 3
IS  - 6
ER  -

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Author Information

Yang Guo-zhong

Business School, Central South University, Changsha, China

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APA Style

Yang Guo-zhong. (2017). Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Advances in Sciences and Humanities, 3(6), 82-86. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

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ACS Style

Yang Guo-zhong. Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Adv. Sci. Humanit. 2017, 3(6), 82-86. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Yang Guo-zhong. Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone. Adv Sci Humanit. 2017;3(6):82-86. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12

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@article{10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12,
  author = {Yang Guo-zhong},
  title = {Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone},
  journal = {Advances in Sciences and Humanities},
  volume = {3},
  number = {6},
  pages = {82-86},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ash.20170306.12},
  abstract = {By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.},
 year = {2017}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Game Theory Analysis on the Incentive Mechanism of Technology Innovation Diffusion in the High-tech Zone
AU  - Yang Guo-zhong
Y1  - 2017/10/31
PY  - 2017
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
T2  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
JF  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
JO  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
SP  - 82
EP  - 86
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2472-0984
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20170306.12
AB  - By constructing and analyzing the incentive model of technology innovation diffusion in high-tech zone, it is found out that the traditional incentive mechanism will lead technology innovation diffusion into “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, and asymmetrical information’s merely direct incentive to the technology diffusion will result in incentive distortion. Thus, the improved incentive mechanism model based on pooling of interests in high-tech zone is brought forward, and the relevant factors influencing the level of innovation diffusion are obtained. There is a further conclusion that the design of incentive contract and incentive coefficient in high-tech zone should accord to the different innovation ability and the marginal income between the enterprises during diffusion respectively.
VL  - 3
IS  - 6
ER  -

Copy | Download